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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
No. 18-3323 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
    
v. 
 
GERALD MERCER 
  Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
Criminal No. 3-17-cr-00019-002 
District Court Judge: Honorable Curtis v. Gomez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R 34.1(a) 
December 10, 2019 
 
Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 30, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
McKee, Circuit Judge. 
Gerald Mercer challenges his conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent 
to distribute. He argues that the District Court erred by not granting his Rule 29 motion for 
 
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
  2 
judgment of acquittal.  For the reasons that follow we will affirm the court’s ruling and Mercer’s 
conviction.1 
I.  
Mercer claims an alleged variance between the single conspiracy charged in Count 
Fourteen of the Third Superseding Indictment and the purported evidence of multiple 
conspiracies presented at trial.  At Count Fourteen, a grand jury charged Mercer with conspiring 
with Makimba Barry and Neal Chesterfield to possess with the intent to distribute 75 kilograms 
or more of cocaine from “on or about January 1, 2012, the exact date being unknown to the 
Grand Jury, and continuing thereafter up to and including on or about November 1, 2016.”2  
Mercer argues that Chesterfield’s testimony that he stopped smuggling cocaine with Mercer in 
December 2014 and thereafter only worked with Barry until his arrest in September 2016, 
demonstrates the existence of two conspiracies and a variance from the indictment warranting his 
acquittal.  
In its review of Mercer’s Rule 29 motion, the district court viewed the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution and determined a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.3  The jury subsequently convicted Mercer.  In our review of the district court’s 
ruling, we apply the same standard as that court under a de novo review of the record.4  We must 
grant Mercer’s motion and vacate his conviction if “(1) there is a variance between the 
indictment and the proof presented at trial and (2) the variance prejudices a substantial right.”5  
 
1 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This court has jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 App. 37-38. 
3 United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 343 (3d Cir. 2014). 
4 Id. 
5 United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 287 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Kelly, 892 
F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
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Whether a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies existed is a question of fact that must be 
determined by the jury.6  Thus, after a verdict, our application of the same standard used by the 
district court includes consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s 
finding of a single conspiracy in a light most favorable to the government.7 
When the District Court heard Chesterfield’s testimony that he had stopped smuggling 
cocaine with Mercer in December 2014 after multiple occasions of not receiving full payment8 it 
questioned counsel at side bar about how, if at all, Mercer was involved in what appeared to be a 
conspiracy between only Chesterfield and Barry.9  The prosecution argued that the original 
conspiracy continued past December 2014 because “it was [Mercer’s] mod[u]s operandi, [and] 
he [was] the one who established th[e] system of trafficking [the] cocaine.”10   Additionally, the 
prosecution presented a witness, Vanier Murraine, who transported cocaine for Barry beginning 
in March of 2016.  Murraine testified that Barry claimed Mercer was his supplier and had been 
since 2011.11   
B. 
  Mercer’s argument rests on Chesterfield’s testimony that he and Mercer stopped 
trafficking drugs together after December 2014.  Assuming Mercer is correct and the prosecution 
failed to establish that he was indirectly supplying the drugs sold by Chesterfield after December 
2014, Mercer has nonetheless failed to show prejudice to some substantial right.12  Under the 
 
6 United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 345 (3d Cir. 2002). 
7 Kemp, 500 F.3d at 287. 
8 App. 154, 158, 161.  
9 App. 159-160. 
10 App. 161. 
11 App. 218. 
12 United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 532 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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variance doctrine, as we explained in United States v. Camiel,13 prejudice occurs where (1) “the 
guilt from one alleged co-schemer [is transferred] to another,” (2) a defendant is left with 
inadequate notice of the actual charges being brought against him and is therefore unable to 
prepare a proper defense, or (3) a defendant is put in the position being charged for the same 
offense twice.14   
However, Mercer cannot show a prejudicial spillover effect where he was tried alone and 
the district court struck Murraine’s testimony.  Furthermore, the District Court repeatedly told 
the jury to “disregard” most of the evidence of Chesterfield and Barry’s 2015-2016 activities, 
making clear that the evidence could not be considered at all in the jury’s deliberations.15  
Because “juries are presumed to follow their instructions,”16 the instructions are a strong 
indication that the evidence did not prejudice Mercer.17  He also cannot claim that he was 
prevented from adequately preparing a defense for a conspiracy of shorter duration than set forth 
in the indictment, especially given that the conspiracy adduced at trial was of shorter duration 
than that set forth in the indictment.  Mercer’s trial involved a single defendant and lasted fewer 
than three days.  Moreover, the Government’s theory of the case was straightforward, and the 
evidence was easy to follow.18  Finally, as Mercer was only convicted of one count in a multi-
 
13 689 F.2d 31, 38 (3d Cir. 1982). 
14 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
15 App. 288. 
16 Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 
211 (1987). 
17 See, e.g., United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 1878 (3d Cir. 2019) (rejecting a claim of 
prejudicial spillover in light of the “Court’s instructions to consider and weight separately the 
evidence on each count as to each defendant”); United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 190 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (similar); United States v. Tyler, 878 F.2d 753, 761 (3d Cir. 1989) (similar). 
18 See Kemp, 500 F.3d at 292 (“[T]he danger of prejudice [resulting from a variance] increases 
along with the number of conspiracies and individuals that make up the wrongly charged single 
conspiracy.”). 
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count indictment, and offers no argument as to how any variance could subject him to trial for 
the same offense in the future,19 he is unable to show that he was prosecuted twice for the same 
offense. 
II. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court’s judgment. 
 
19 Appellant’s Br. at 14. 
